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WHOSE PUBLIC INTEREST IS IT
ANYWAY?: ADVICE FOR ALTRUISTIC
YOUNG LAWYERS
PatriciaM. Wald*
I.
A.

THE PUBLIC INTEREST LAWYER

The Public Interest Law Movement

It is by now a ritual for judges and elders of the bar to lecture
prospective young lawyers that they should devote a significant part
of their career to pro bono work. Pro bono of course is short for pro
bono publico-for the good of the public. I can certainly attest
from my own forty years in the law that there are great satisfactions
in devoting one's skills to a cause larger than money or even professional reputation. But I can also tell you that doing good can be
hard work, and that a lifetime of public service requires just as
much, probably more, prudence, discretion, judgment, tolerance for
frustration, and long-range perspective as for-profit lawyering. Tonight, drawing on my own experiences in three phases of public interest lawyering, I will discuss some of the conflicts and dilemmas
nontraditional lawyering poses. I do this-heaven knows-not to
discourage would-be novitiates, but to counsel a kind of idealistic
realism, to be contrasted with unfocused feel-good notions, about
donating one's working life to the great unwashed, certainly the
great undefined, public interest out there.
The Bible warns against squandering one's talents profligately.
And there are just so many years, just so much energy and commitment in any lawyer's lifetime. A series of tough questions, not all of
which I am confident I can answer myself, may help steer those of
you interested in public service closer to success, which I define as a
sense at the end of your career that you have contributed, commensurate with your talent and skills, to the slow but measured advance
of your community and nation toward a more just society.
My first question would be: Why do I want to serve the public
interest anyway, reserving for a moment the definition of what that
is? In short, what is the source of my altruism? Is it really concern
for others or a thin disguise for other less laudable motives-a good
r6sum6 (useful for those with political or judicial ambitions) or an
opportunity to feel good about myself and superior, even controlling, toward those I serve without pay, a welcome contrast to some
to the irritating demands of a paying client. A reviewer of Robert
Coles's recent book on altruism commented perceptively, "Among
the many forms of human action, few are subject to more misunder*

Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

1995]

WHOSE PUBLIC INTEREST IS IT ANYWAY?

5

standing, cynicism or rancor than the idealistic ventures of volunteers and activists who try to make life better for someone else."' In
the same vein, Anna Freud once observed:
How sad that in the name of goodness and kindness to others
one can see plenty of mean-spirited behavior-a demanding,
controlling, manipulative, condescending self-centered ruthlessness that masks itself as good will, as an effort at charity, as
an attempt to change the world, reform a given society.2
Others say that the only true altruists are those who perform
small anonymous acts of charity in their daily lives, not global reformers. But that kind of selflessness is hard to sustain. Early in my
career I did legal services work; after a few years of running to court
to stay evictions, seeking child support for bereft mothers, trying to
recoup denied welfare benefits, I became a class action/test case
junkie, desperately anxious for the single mandate that would spell
meaningful relief for the many. Those dedicated young lawyers who
do invest many more years affording poor people, children, aliens,
and criminal defendants individualized legal help deserve our applause. But many eventually gravitate toward a kind of public interest work that aims at more dramatic changes in laws,' the so-called
public interest segment of the bar, spawned in the 1970s and now
claiming over 1000 lawyers in 160 centers throughout the country,
financed primarily by individual contributions or foundation grants. 4
After decades of pro bono practice, no one yet has a sharp or
clean definition of public interest law. Years ago, Thurgood Marshall enthused about those lawyers who:
provide representation to a broad range of relatively powerless minorities-for example, to the mentally ill, to children,
to the poor of all races. They also represent neglected interests that are widely shared by most of us as consumers, workers, and as individuals in need of privacy and a healthy
environment. These lawyers have, I believe, made an impor1. E. J. Dionne, Jr., Making the World a Better Place,WAsm Posr, Oct. 10, 1993
(Book World), at 3 (reviewing Robert Coles, The Call of Service (1993)).
2. Id. at 7. See also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Is Altruism Possible in Lawyering?,
8 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 385 (1992) (tracing roots of altruism in legal profession and
application to pro bono activities).
3. See, eg., Richard C. Reuben, The Case of a Lifetime, A.B.A. J. April 1994, at
70 (1994) (detailing pro bono cases that have "shaped the law in important ways");
Debra S. Katz & Lynne Bernabei; PractisingPublicInterest Law in a Private Public
Interest Law Frm The IdealSetting to Challenge the Power, 96 W. VA. L. RFv. 293

(1994); Tigran W.Eldred & Thomas Schoenhnerr, The Lawyer's Duty of PublicService: More Than Charity?, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 367 (1994) (review of conflicting notions about lawyer's obligation to serve the needs of the poor).

4. NAN

ARON, LIBERTY AND

Jusnca FOR ALL 27 (1989) (158 groups employing

906 lawyers in 1984); BURTON A.

WEISBROD ET AL., PuBi-c INmnsr LAw, AN
ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 552 (1978) (166 firms employing nearly

1000 lawyers).
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tant contribution ... they have made our legal process work
better... and, by helping open doors to our legal system, they
have moved us a little closer to the ideal of equal justice for
all. 5
And an early public interest lawyer described it this way: "We were
doing what [the elite law firm] was doing for corporate clients, except we were doing it for citizens' organizations: for poor people,
for civil rights groups, for neighborhood development corporations,
for consumer and environmental groups." 6
That kind of client-oriented definition didn't last long, however,
as the young conservatives of the 1980s claimed the mantle of public
interest law for themselves as well. Generously supported by corporations, trade associations, conservative constituency groups and
foundations, these new recruits did not see their mission as representing the previously unrepresented; to the contrary, they vigorously advocated the case of private developers against land use
regulators, opposed limitations on the use of pesticides and fought
CAFE standards for automobile emissions. With their arrival on the
scene, public interest law could no longer be viewed as a monolithic
movement, dedicated to a single political agenda.7
This capsulized history raises a second, related question for young
lawyers embarked on a public interest career in the private sector.
How do I define the "public interest" I so unselfishly want to serve?
You can, of course, throw your lot in with a defined constituency
group, acting as the legal arm of a larger political or social movement-the Sierra Club, the Legal Defense and Education Fund of
the NAACP, the Native Americans Rights Fund, the Women's Law
Center, and so on. Lawyering for such groups may not differ that
much from private practice; the lawyer is obliged within professional
and ethical rules zealously to advocate his clients' causes, as defined
by the clients. Although young lawyers representing such groups
may get more chances to participate in the policymaking of their
constituent organization than private practice counterparts, or to exercise more control over what cases are brought because of funding
shortfalls, still, they must decide if the organization's overall goals
and priorities are their own. Thus across the legal landscape we see
environmentalists opposing Native Americans; labor unionists vying
with racial and ethnic minorities and women's advocates; prochoicers pitted against right-to-lifers, all perceiving themselves as
public interest lawyers. In reality, they represent only one of many
segments, and that is the reason why their critics so often refer to
5. Justice Thurgood Marshall, Address to the Award of Merit Luncheon of the
Bar Activities of the American Bar Association (Aug. 10, 1975).
6. ARON, supra note 4, at 87 (quoting Charles Halpern, founder of Center for
Law and Social Policy).

7. Id. at 74-78.
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them, not illogically, as special interest lawyers. Often their claim to
the public interest label lies principally in the notion that by representing the unrepresented (when that is true) they legitimize and
fortify the basic adversary legal system for settling disputes and obtaining benefits.
This fact of life dictates a considerable degree of humility about
one's status as a public interest lawyer, it also dictates care in the
selection of causes. Few public interest lawsuits are zero sum games;
as inall litigation someone wins and someone loses. But in utilizing
the resources of the law to promote the interests of one part of society over another, "special" or "public interest" advocates, however
designated, are playing with heavy weapons; they are forcing society's hand on some of the most difficult resource allocation choices
it has, weighing in on one side of the scale against other sides.' According to Jack Greenberg, former Director of the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund, "You have to strike a balance, and with each case,
judge whether the net effect will be better than if the case had not
been brought. It's always a judgment call." 9 What is not clear from
Greenberg's statement is whether the "net effect" is calculated according to the client group's interests or the effect on society as a
whole. And that, of course, is the conscience always prodding public interest lawyers. Is it enough if I ask whether the case advances
my group's special interest, or should I include the harder question
of whether society's interests are furthered?
Now in the real world, as practitioners like to call it, young lawyers must initially make a decision that their "comfort level" is high
enough with a special group's agenda that they will not need to recalculate the net win/loss ratio for society on each case. But there
will come a point in almost every causist's career when a lawsuit
looks so skewed or antisocial that she will balk, and if it happens
frequently enough, feel compelled to leave. That is the framework
within which all conscientious special interest lawyers live. It is a
markedly different one from that of the archetypical tobacco lawyer
who is asked, as Roger Rosenblatt did recently in the New York
8. Some lawyers say the duty to advocate for the best interests of a single client
obviates the need to consider how zealous representation may affect society. The
classic example of this view is Lord Brougham, a defense lawyer who stated that he
was prepared to bring down the kingdom for his client in Queen Caroline's Case:.
[Ain advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the
world, and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and
expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, amongst
them to himself, is his first and only duty;, and in performing that duty he
must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may
bring to others. Separating the duty of a patriot from that of an advocate,
he must go on reckless of the consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his country in confusion.
2 Trial of Queen Caroline 8 (1821).
9. Id.at 108-09.

[Vol. 47:3
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Times, how he can live with himself,1" or even that of the nondiscriminating counsel who does not attempt to make any judgments at
all about whether he is doing good or bad for society but says, "Let
the courts decide."
Why the higher standard for noncommercial lawyers? For one
thing, they play for higher stakes, usually not content to reallocate
resources from one individual to another, but rather to make government or major economic forces behave in a particular way, to
shift resources to benefit one segment of society, usually at the risk
of another segment. Although true only as a generalization, blurry
at the edges, this responsibility entails harder ethical decisions. On
a more personal basis, most lawyers who eschew private practice do
so at substantial monetary cost, and their personal self-worth requires that they do a periodic self-audit to determine whether the
trade-off continues to be worthwhile.
Inthe late 1970s, the Ford Foundation commissioned an evaluation of the public interest movement. 1 The core inquiry was
whether this kind of voluntary not-for-profit lawyering enhanced
the general welfare in any quantifiable way. The study asked first:
Will a particular lawsuit promote allocative efficiency, that is, will it
put society's productive resources to their optimum use? Or, alternatively, will it promote allocative equity by dividing the fruits of
those resources in a more equitable way? Ford concluded, predict12
ably, that most public interest lawsuits fell into the latter category.
The study also found that our society has some shared standards of
allocative equity by which the legitimacy of these lawsuits can be
judged.
[I]t is not equitable for people to live in abject poverty no matter how unproductive they may be;... it is not equitable for
children to go without medical care and schooling simply because their parents are unproductive in the marketplace; it is
not equitable for non-whites, women, the aged, and other easily identified persons to suffer from discrimination whether or
not it is privately efficient for employers to base hiring decisions on the low-cost information ...

contained

..

in the

13
knowledge of a worker's color, sex, or age.
The evaluators found, too, that different kinds of lawsuits benefit
different sectors of the community. Thus, they said, "[T]he greatest
benefits per person from [public interest law] activities in the environmental, consumerism, and voter-information areas accrue to a
subset of the population that is extraordinarily well-educated and

10. Roger Rosenblatt, How Do Tobacco Executives Live With Themselves?, N.Y.
TimS, March 20, 1994, (Magazine) at 36.
11. WEISBROD, supra note 4.
12. lIdat 7.
13. lIdat 18.
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well-off financially, compared with the U.S. population as a
whole."' 4 But employment discrimination, education, occupational
safety, and health lawsuits produced a different reallocation. For example, thirty class actions brought by the Washington Lawyers
Committee for Civil Rights opened up 230,000 additional entry-level
or blue-collar jobs for women and minorities.' 5
Some other hard truths emerged. Although the authors of the
Ford study ultimately concluded the voluntary nonprofit sector efforts of public interest lawyers can in some cases be more efficient in
advancing allocative equity standards than either the private sector
or government,' 6 they also emphasized that judicial victories alone
are not always necessary or sufficient to bring about change in private individuals or government officials;17 that public interest litigation is most valuable when it is undertaken on behalf of interests not
normally represented in the governmental decisional processes; and
that public interest law successes are limited by funding, lobbying
restrictions, conflicts among different interests and, sadly, by a lack
among groups as to where their own best interests
of understanding
8
lie.'
Public interest litigation-at the time of the Ford report and, I
think, still-is most successful in compelling agencies to enforce existing laws and regulations and in requiring courts or agencies to
flesh out crucial "details" of protective legislation that legislators
omit. On occasion it paves the way for agency heads to demand
more money from legislators to do their job right, and it has sometimes made institutions fundamentally reorient their care-giving
functions.' 9 But public interest litigation has been severely criticized-not entirely without justification-for slowing down government processes, overburdening the courts, and concentrating on
centralized policymaking in Washington, D.C. rather than grassroots
program development.2' Disappointingly, even winning decrees
take decades of compliance efforts or, more discouraging still, are
just plain ignored. Public interest veterans complain, "[We] never
expected it would take so long to implement court decisions. It
often seems like you never win. Your adversaries keep coming
back. You have to constantly fight to win battles you thought were
21
over."
14. Id. at 145.
15. Id. at 283.
16. Id. at 554.
17. Id. at 553-55.

18. Id. at 554, 556-58. See also Henry J.Reske, Ralph Nader's New Project,
A.B.A. J. May 1994, at 32 (new group will work with local community organizations,
not individuals, for systemic improvements in housing, public safety, etc.).
19. WEISBROD, supra note 4, at 216; ARON, supra note 4, at 97.
20. ARON, supra note 4, at 105.
21. Id. at 107 (quoting Alvin Bronstein and Judith Lichtman).
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What conclusions do I expect you to draw from all this? That
public interest lawyering is not constantly fulfilling; that trying to
play God can be an uncomfortable, even self-doubting role; that in
many cases it is simply special interest lawyering; that most public
interest lawsuits redistribute resources, rather than add to them; and
finally, that lawsuits, perhaps because they are so adversarial, are
not always the best way to change behavior, and legal victories can
take decades to monitor, as well as induce unanticipated consequences. Judgment-calls on litigation made under financial constraints often involve the least elevated of concerns: what one's staff
can do best, which judge will rule on the case, or how much publicity
the case will generate for the project.'
To illustrate these ambiguities, let me talk briefly about two public
interest law cases I worked on in the 1970s, one on behalf of handicapped children seeking public education and one to deinstitutionalize St. Elizabeth's Hospital mental patients in Washington, D.C.
Both suits were brought (and won) in the early 1970s; both are still
active and not yet fully settled in the federal district court in our
circuit today, over twenty years later. Both cases raise significant
questions about the net effect of the "rights" they established; yet
there can be little doubt that both performed catalytic functions in
changing the social equities for handicapped children and mentally
ill persons. But in both cases you might well ask the question-I
have often asked it myself-was the effort enlightened or tunnelvisioned, a net gain or net loss for the public interest?
B. Special Education
Mills v. Board of Education23 was a class action brought on behalf
of all physically and mentally handicapped, retarded, and emotionally disturbed children ("challenged" children in the current parlance) who had been denied admission to or expelled from the D.C.
public schools because of their disabilities. In 1971, when the suit
was filed, there were an estimated 22,000 such children in D.C.' 4 At
the time of the suit, less than $1 million was being spent on the education of handicapped children in D.C. Mills was the second such
case brought in the nation, the first to encompass physical or emotional disabilities as well as retardation. The plaintiffs, the Center
for Law & Social Policy, and the National Legal Aid and Defenders
Association, based their suit on D.C. laws and regulations that, we
argued, guaranteed an entitlement of a public school education to
all children as well as on a constitutional equal protection theory
that presupposed education was a basic right that could not be denied a child because of a condition beyond her control.
22. Id. at 99.
23. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).

24. I& at 868.
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The D.C. Board of Education's opposition to the suit was perfunctory. The corporation counsel relied, rather limply, on the defense that no money from the regular school budget appropriation
could be diverted to special education. The trial judge, however,
ruled that handicapped children deserved to share in whatever general funds were appropriated for education. He also bought most of
our prescription for wide-reaching relief. a guarantee of individualized diagnosis, prescription, and placement within fifty days in an
appropriate program for all handicapped children, including those
suspended or expelled for disciplinary reasons if the underlying
cause was emotional disturbance. These individualized education
plans could be challenged by the child's parents in hearings before
arbiters from outside the school system, with an eventual appeal to
the court.
Following the Mills decree, which never was appealed, the system
cranked into operation; three hundred hearings were held within the
first nineteen months. 5 In that time the number of students diagnosed as in need of special education rose 75%, but the special education budget increased by only 25%,6 predictably, complaints
abounded that this money was being taken from non-handicapped
children. On the other hand, parents of handicapped children
thought the hearings were stacked in favor of finding that disabled
children could be accommodated in special education programs set
up within the school system rather than through subsidized placements in the parent-preferred private programs around the city.
In the mid-1970s, Congress, drawing in substantial part on D.C.'s
experience under the Mills court decree, passed the Education of
the Handicapped Act, later renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").2 7 The Act provided needed funding
for special education in local school systems and established the
kind of individualized placement and hearing requirements already
required under Mills. The Act stressed what we called "mainstreaming" then (it is called "inclusion" now), the placement of children within the regular classrooms, bolstered with supplementary
help if necessary, rather than in segregated programs serving handicapped children only. But a basic conflict was surfacing. In 1974
testimony we warned the House Committee, "There is a real danger
that [the] mainstream philosophy can be used as a cover-up for inadthat do not satisfy these children's real, speequate school programs
'
cial education needs."
25. Hearings on H.R. 70 Before the Select Subcomm. on Education of House
Comm. on Education and Labor, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 194 [hereinafter Education
Hearings] (testimony of Patricia M. Wald).
26. Id. at 192.
27. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988); Pub. L No. 102-119, 105 Stat. 587 (renamed
1991).
28. Education Hearings,supra note 25, at 193.
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Almost twenty years later, this problem we foresaw has become
the subject of an intense national debate, while the legal concept we
fought for in Mills, that every handicapped child is entitled to a publicly-supported education suitable to his needs, is universally accepted and firmly settled in statutory law. Financial pressures have
skewed the system in the direction of keeping handicapped children
in regular classrooms, whatever the nature or condition of their disability. Mainstreaming or inclusion has become not only politically
correct but economically necessary. The District of Columbia has
been placing more and more of its exceptional children in regular
classrooms and has recently closed down the special education
school it set up in the wake of Mills. 9 D.C. school officials are now
refusing to pay special education tuition for private placements in all
but the most exceptional cases, although judges are still ordering
these special placements on behalf of disgruntled parents. 30 A
Washington Post article concluded, "[C]ontrolling tuition costs is
part of a larger issue: a bitter feud over whether the District school
system is capable of efficiently identifying students who need help
and quickly placing them in appropriate programs. ' 31 The school
system reportedly takes from one to two years from identification to
placement, despite the fifty-day deadline on the process mandated
by Mills. As a result of its tardiness, last year D.C. spent 25% of its
special education budget for private boarding school tuition and
$750,000 for attorneys' fees in lost court cases. 32
Other cities, it appears, are equally bedeviled by how to meet
their legal and educational obligations to children with disabilities.
The New York Times recently ran a series on these cities' experiences with the results of lawsuits similar to Mills that mandated education for all disabled children. Although New York's education
system was trying desperately to lower special education costs and
include more disabled children in regular classrooms, teachers in
mainstreamed classrooms were complaining of having to distribute
Ritalin (a tranquilizer), change catheters, and, where deaf students
were not provided an interpreter, learn sign language.33 Opinions
were sharply at variance on whether inclusion works in all or even in
most cases. An interpreter for a deaf girl "included" in a regular
29. Hamil R. Harris, Learning-DisabledStudents Face Change; School Closing
Thrusts Some Into Mainstream, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 1993, at J1, J7.
30. Leonard Hughes, Embroiled in Special Education;School Officials Battle 7Tl.
tion Increases, Backlog, WAsH. Posr, Sept. 16, 1993, at J1 (only 487 D.C. special
education students are in private schools at public expense, compared to 6600 In
public special education programs).
31. Hughes, supra note 30, at J1.
32. Id. at J1, J7.
33. Gary TIruman, Special Pupils, Regular Classes, Thorny Issues, N.Y. Timm,
Jan. 26. 1994. at A19.
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public school class wrote a moving account of the girl's half-life in
that classroom.
Alongside that story, however, was a more upbeat account of an-

other mainstreamed pupil, an autistic first grader who could not
speak when he came to school, who stayed alone much of the time
and threw tantrums for no reason. Ian spent half a day in regular

school and half in a special class. Within months, with the support
of his regular classmates and the teaching assistant, he was speaking.

The New York Times reported on his progress.
It seemed clear to the staff at Gateway that if Ian could prove
so capable of inclusion, then virtually any other student could
as well. And it didn't seem to benefit only Ian; sometimes inwhat it offered the reguclusion's greatest value seemed to be
35
lar kids who had contact with him.
Albert Shanker, President of the American Federation of Teach-

ers, is skeptical of the "problematic placements" that full-scale inclusion entails. "It makes no more sense to insist on including all

kids with disabilities in regular classrooms, regardless of their condition, than it made to exclude them all."

The Learning Disabilities

Association, a parents' organization, opposes mandatory inclusion
as well, but the U.S. Department of Education, which administers

special education grants of $18 billion a year, has, in the past, ap34. The author discussed an alternative to inclusion:
This girl could go to a federally-financed school for the deaf, where all
students can converse with each other, all the information is presented
visually, teachers sign and deaf adults serve as role models, deaf kids lead
the student government and star in the school play.
These schools prepare students for jobs and college. They also give the
students access to the deaf community, which has its own language, folklore, traditions, social clubs, periodicals, athletic teams and political events.
The schools have always served as the cultural center of the deaf community. Yet proponents of inclusion would like to close them, claiming that it
would liberate deaf people from the "discrimination" of separate schooling
and give them equality. All it would require are some sign-language interpreters to smooth out the differences, they say.
To many deaf people, this is at best maddeningly naive; at worst, it is
chauvinistic. The history of deaf people is one of mandated assimilation:
we can make you more like hearing people, we can make you more normal.... Is it the policy that will best serve deaf people? Or is it simply a
way to further that great American myth, the one we seem to need like
oxygen, that says we're all created equal?
Leah Hager Cohen, Schools for A1 or Separate But Equal?; An Interpreter Isn't
Enough, N.Y. Tnmss, Feb. 22, 1994, at A21.
35. Russell Martin, Stepping Into the World, N.Y. TMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at A21.
36. Albert Shanker, ProblematicPlacements, N.Y. TmsEs, Mar. 27, 1994, at E7
(advertisement); see also Carol Innerst, Teachers Rally on 'Special Needs'; Union
Opposes 'FullInclusion," WAsh. Tmms, July 18, 1994, at A3 (American Federation
of Teachers steps up war against "full inclusion" by releasing poll that shows 77% of
teachers in schools with such policies or moving toward that goal oppose idea).
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peared to be a strong advocate of inclusion,37 although a recent
Congressionally mandated five-year study of what happens to "special needs students"
in regular classrooms casts doubt on any total
38
inclusion policy.
New York City's push toward inclusion is understandable. According to the New York Times, New York City's special education
system has, since the court decree came down over two decades ago,
39
become a "Cadillac in a school system of broken-down Fords."
More than twenty-two cents of every New York City education dollar or $1.7 billion annually is spent on special education; the special
education staff comprises almost 25% of all school system employees, serving 130,000 pupils or 13% of the City's one million school
children.' Critics say the system "mislabels thousands of children,
segregating many in dead-end classes from which few are ever released."'" In fact, 70% of students referred to special education are
"learning disabled" or "emotionally handicapped," not deaf, blind,
physically handicapped, or retarded.4' The vast majority (84%) of
the learning disabled or emotionally handicapped students are black
or Hispanic, and there is evidence that they are hurt, flot helped, by
consignment to the special education programs where they "languish" without stimulation. 3

In March of 1994, New York City's new School Chancellor Cortines announced his intention to downsize and decentralize the education specialists by putting them under the direction of local
principals. Yet, within a year, reacting to pressures from parents,
school employees, unions and politicians, Mr. Cortines announced
he would postpone any shake-ups for at least another year. a4 A
frustrated Mayor Guliani, still seeking budget cuts, has deployed a
special advisor to look into the problem. That advisor now says the
City is doing more for disabled children than the law requires,
37. MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (Public Broadcasting System, June 2, 1994).
38. See 'Special Needs' and Classrooms,WASH. PosT, Oct. 10, 1994, at A22 (special needs students who spend all their time in regular classrooms fail more frequently than those who spend only part time there).
39. Sam Dillon, Special Education Absorbs School Resources, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
7, 1994, at Al.
40. Sam Dillon, CortinesDelays ChangingSpecial Education System, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1994, at 31.
41. Dillon, supra note 39, at Al.
42. Ia

43. A recent City Comptroller Report said that although nearly one quarter of
the educational budget is spent on special education, the school system has "no way
of measuring whether disabled students are getting an education or are developing
skills ..
" Sam Dillon, Comptroller Report Faults Special Education Policy, N.Y.
TMFs, June 27, 1994, at B3 (cost less than $6500 to educate a student in regular
classroom contrasted with $18,705 for special education). See also Lynda Richardson, Minority Students Languish in Special Education System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6,
1994, at Al.
44. Dillon, supra note 40, at 31.
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spending up to $18,000 for such pupils as compared to $3000-$5000
for regular pupils. The Board of Education's budget director laments: 45"Kids that don't have court orders in their hands are dead
meat."

That is the legacy of one public interest lawsuit. Handicapped
children are in school, an increasing number in regular classes. Regular classrooms are good for some handicapped children, probably
not for all. On net, however, more of these children are better off
than in 1970; there is more money in the system for their education,
though clearly not enough. Lawsuits like Mills helped put the
money there. The downside of mainstreaming is the oversized burden on teachers to act as nurses, social workers, and therapists and
the time that these extra responsibilities take from their education
activities for normal pupils. Was it a lawsuit that should have been
brought? The benefit to society of giving handicapped children a
chance to achieve up to their capacity is unknown; the burden on
regular pupils is unknown as well. Nonetheless, few would go back
to 1970 when our lead plaintiff, a severely retarded boy of thirteen,
had never been inside a classroom, spending endless days in a ghetto
back bedroom tied to his bed by a distraught mother who had
posted a sign on the door: "Beware of Idiot Child."
C. Deinstitutionalization
The second case I worked on, many years ago, allows for an even
less definitive assessment of the values of public interest litigation.
Dixon v. Weinberger' was the deinstitutionalization case, also
brought in the 1970s, that sought to accelerate the release from
long-term institutions of mentally ill persons who could make it on
the outside with adequate support. The cruelty of being kept for an
entire lifetime in barren, sometimes brutal settings without any
treatment or rehabilitation seemed clear from the start; what became clear only later, however, was that society was not yet willing
to provide the resources to allow those inmates to survive outside
the institution-job training, residential facilities, out-patient care,
crisis intervention services. Without such resources, is life on the
streets better or worse than inside the institutions? An estimated
one-quarter to one-third of homeless persons suffer from mental or
emotional illness.47

45. Sam Dillon, Badillo Contends that the Cost of Special Education is Inflated,
N.Y. TAms, Aug. 14, 1994, (Metro) at 1, 40.
46. 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975).
47. Christopher Jencks, The Homeless, N.Y. REvmw, Apr. 21, 1994, at 22-23
(surveys show one-fourth of homeless admit to having been in mental hospital; clinicians conclude one-third have "severe" mental disorders; one-third of Chicago sample of homeless reported "voices" and delusions).
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The Mental Health Law Project, now the David L. Bazelon
Center for Mental Health Law, where I worked in the 1970s, was a
pioneer in the movement to formulate the civil rights and liberties of
mentally ill and retarded persons. One of the first cases we tookall the way up to the Supreme Court-was that of Kenneth Donaldson, a Florida mental asylum inmate who had been locked up without treatment for fifteen years because of chronic mental disorders
though he was not considered dangerous to himself or others. Our
lawyers argued that such a person may not be institutionalized
against his will without treatment, and the Supreme Court eventually agreed he must be released. *" In the twenty years since, he has,
incidentally, become a self-sufficient member of society as well as a
reformer of the mental health system. Testifying before Congress a
few years after his release, Donaldson spoke of his fifteen-year
ordeal in an underfunded, understaffed Florida state institution:
The saddest thing is seeing people die in front of your eyesnot only old men,.., old men of course go quicker than the
younger ones. They would give up hope after about two years.
People deteriorate physically when they are in confinementpeople. But many of the older people just
even the oyoung
gave up.
For ten years, Donaldson's only doctor had been an obstetrician
who cared for 1300 other patients, appearing once every few months
to ask the same rote questions: "What ward are you on? Are you
working? Are you taking medication?" During his time, Donaldson witnessed sadistic attendants, physical abuse, and free intermingling of insane criminals and docile, senile old men. Donaldson was0
convinced he survived only because he refused to take medication.
The deinstitutionalization suits, however, were not confined to the
Donaldsons, who likely could survive on the outside without special
services. Our plea was for those who did not need to be institutionalized if they had the support of outside services, and our requested
relief was that the community simultaneously reduce institutional
populations and establish alternative services. In Washington we
sued both the federal and D.C. governments (each having overlapping responsibilities for St. Elizabeth's, the leading mental institution), asking for patient evaluation, discharge of those who could be
maintained on the outside, prompt establishment of needed community services, and judicial monitoring of a plan to accomplish the
transfer. Ambitious? A bit, I would say in retrospect. Our legal
theory was that patients whose liberty is taken from them through
48. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
49. Mental Health and the Elderly:Joint HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on LongTerm Careand the Subcomm. on Health of the Elderly of the Sen. Special Comm. on
Aging, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1975) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
50. Id at 9-10 (testimony of Kenneth Donaldson).
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civil commitment have a right to the least restrictive kind of control,
in this case outside living with the requirement they accept monitoring, psychiatric services, specialized living conditions, whatever it
took to keep them from posing a danger to themselves. The hospital
staff itself calculated that 43% of the inmates, roughly one thousand
patients, did not need total institutionalized care. Again, as in Mills,
we had a statutory ground for our suit; the 1964 Hospitalization for
the Mentally m Act required the District of Columbia to place patients in the least restrictive alternative settings necessary for their
care and protection.5 '
Our lead plaintiff, Herbert Dixon, was a very different type of
patient from Kenneth Donaldson. He was confined to a wheelchair,
sixty-five years old, institutionalized for twenty-three years, often
confused and disoriented. Our mental health experts told us Dixon
and others like him needed small community-based homes with adequately trained operators and visiting therapists; we estimated 350
such personal care homes serving six patients apiece would be
needed in the District to take care of those who met appropriate
outplacement criteria. Medicare, Medicaid, and Supplemental Security Income entitlements could provide some of the funds for such
community care but clearly not all.
The suit was filed in February 1974. In December 1975, District
Judge Aubrey Robinson ruled that the D.C. and federal governments jointly must create community-based services for patients
who could live outside of a total care situation. But it was not until
April 1980, after five years of negotiation, that federal and D.C. officials finally agreed to a plan outlining standards for assessing patients eligible for outplacement and the community facilities into
which they could appropriately be moved. The court approved the
plan and set up the Dixon Implementation Monitoring Committee
("DIMC") as the enforcer. In October 1984, Congress set a schedule for transfer of the operation of St. Elizabeth's to the District and
again mandated a comprehensive community-based mental health
service system; in March 1987, the D.C. Commissioner of Mental
Health agreed to.a specific timetable for the creation of community
residences and outreach services; in June 1989, the District signed
on to a new two-year schedule to reduce hospital beds at St. Elizabeth's and develop alternate community living arrangements; in January 1992, the court ratified a new consent order between the
lawyers of the Mental Health Law Project and the District for a fiveyear plan to accommodate 5000 patients, including 2500 homeless in
375 residences at a cost of $8 million; in May 1993, the judge, frustrated by the failure to make any serious starts at implementation of

51. Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. at 979.
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the five-year plan, appointed a master to oversee its development,"2
lamenting: "[Twelve] years is long enough for the District to perfect
and effectuate a system which protects the legal rights and lives of
the mentally ill in the community consistent with its statutory
mandate. 53
(A personal note that gives some perspective on the pace of these
developments: Between 1975 and 1994, I was appointed to the
Court of Appeals, after seven years became Chief Judge, served five
years of my term, continued as an active judge in the four years
since; Judge Robinson became Chief Judge of the District Court,
served his term of ten years and took senior status. All this while we
worked together; after twenty years the case drags on.)
Three months after the master was appointed, the D.C. Council
repealed the thirty-year-old statutory provision guaranteeing treatment in the least restrictive setting on which the lawsuit had been
based seventeen years earlier.5 4 In April 1994 the master, whose
one-year term was scheduled to end in July, again reported
"botched contracts, untrained workers, budget problems and an
overall lack of commitment" from the District.5"
St. Elizabeth's is a sad and unfinished story. Other cities, small
and big, have variations on the same theme. In January 1994, the
Public Broadcasting System ran a Frontline story called A Placefor
Madness detailing the results of a deinstitutionalization suit in Massachusetts.5 6 In 1955, 2300 mentally ill people were living in
wretched conditions in a state hospital in Northampton; a class action brought on a theory similar to ours obtained their release; now
the institution has been closed down and only twenty-five remain in
a total care setting. The town complains they are roaming the
streets, although few disruptive incidents are reported. Most live on
welfare in a place called Mrs. Shaw's Motel where an untrained but
compassionate woman watches over them, calling the authorities
52. Amy Goldstein, Court Takes Over D.C. Mental Health Services; Judge Gives
Reins to Outside Specialist, WASH. POST, May 18, 1993, at Al.
53. Claudia Schlosberg, Misguided Management of the Mentally ill, WASH. POsT,
July 11, 1993, at C8; see also James Ragland & Amy Goldstein, Orderon Mentally Ill
Seems Intrusive to Kelly, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993, at Cl.
54. Laurie Davis, An Expensive Way to Hurt the Homeless, WASH. PosT, July 25,
1993, at C8.
55. Nancy Lewis, Report Blasts D.C. Mental Health Care Record, WASH. POST,
Apr. 23, 1994, at B3. See also Letter from Peter Nickles to U.S. District Court Judge
Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. (Feb. 25, 1994) (on file with author). Ironically, the cost for
a St. Elizabeth's inpatient has risen to $300 per day, for an outpatient $70. Bureaucratic delay or intransigence or both thus entail estimated annual costs of $90,000
per patient for institutional services that could be had in the community for $21,000.
Davis, supra note 54.
56. Frontline A Place for Madness (WETA television broadcast, Jan. 18, 1994),
reviewed in Sandra G. Boodman, Closing a State Mental Hospital,WASH. POST, Jan.
18, 1994, (Health) at Z8.
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when her roomers become uncontrollable. The legal services lawyer
who brought that suit has no regrets. "The largest and most heinous
crime [about the institution] was that we had made people invisible." ' A commentator on the Northampton experience concludes,
"The failures of deinstitutionalization are in large part a reflection
of inadequate and inaccessible community services, not of the fact
that former patients were too sick to live outside hospitals."'
There are changes in the wind. This past year, Governor Cuomo

came up with a plan for New York's mentally ill under which money
saved in closing mental health institutions would be specifically allocated to community mental health services.5 9 It doesn't happen au-

tomatically. In 1955 there were eighteen hospitals in New York for
93,000 patients; in 1993 there were twenty-two hospitals for 10,000
patients; after about forty years there were 82,500 fewer hospital
beds but only 12,500 more community beds for the mentally ill.' °
Governor Cuomo has striven to close down institutions, not beds; he
and the legislature eventually agreed on how to siphon $180 million
61
saved from closing five hospitals back into community services.

He may have a tiger by the tail, but he is at least trying to contain it.
57. Id.Visibility alone may have a potential for effecting long-term changes in
public attitudes toward the mentally ill and disabled. See, e.g., Maria Laurino, Out
of the Attic and Asylum and Into the Camera'sEye, N.Y. Tumms, July 3, 1994, § 2, at
1, 18 (more frequent appearances of mentally ill and retarded persons as heroes on
television and in movies attributed to "increased presence.., in schools, offices and
neighborhoods since deinstitutionalization; the once demonized 'other' has become
the boy next door.").
58. Boodman, supra note 56.
59. Kevin Sack, Why Politics, As Usual Is Not Helping the Mentally Ill, N.Y.
Trmms, July 26, 1993, at E5 (the estimated number of mentally ill nationally will grow
to nearly 33 million by the year 2010. Since 1955, the number of institutional patients has gone down from 559,000 to 100,000 and several of the less populous states
have actually made community care work. Wisconsin, for example, allocates money
per county which the county then decides how to spend; in Madison only 50 out of
1300 patients are in long-term total care. Ohio has reduced its inmate population

from 3800 to 2000 since 1988). See generally NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, MANAGING
MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS IN THE CoMMuNiTY (1994) (reporting on Milwaukee's
successful efforts at keeping mentally ill offenders stable and law-abiding through
community support programs).
60. Michael Winerip, A Homefor Anthony, N.Y. Tubms MAGAzINE, June 5,1994,
(Magazine) at 50, 52 (New York spends $100,000 a year to care for a patient in
hospital compared to $35,000 in group home); H. Jack Geiger, A House This Side of
Madness, N.Y. Tnms, July 10, 1994 (REvmw oF BooKs) (reviewing MIcRAE-L
WimEn,,9 IGHLAND ROAD (1994), recounting the history of a group home and its
problems with "Not in My Backyard" syndrome).
61. Mary Brosnahan & David Giffen, Out of Hospitals, Left on the Streets, N.Y.
Tmms, Aug. 7, 1993, at 21 (state spends 60% of mental health budget on 10% of
mentally ill persons in hospitals; hospital population has declined to 10,500, for every
hospital bed emptied, the state saves $105,000 annually); A Wise Plan for the Mentally Ill, N.Y. Tnms, Nov. 19, 1993, at A32 (substantial portion of projected savings
of $210 million over five years from closing down five institutions will be channelled
to community services). On the other hand the New York Tunes reports "momen-
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There have been some spectacular success stories with other dein-

stitutionalized populations. In 1973 our same Mental Health Law
Project successfully sued New York State to deinstitutionalize the
notorious Willowbrook, the principal state facility for the mentally
retarded, housing 23,300 retarded persons in sordid and despicable

conditions.62 By dint of a pugnacious judge who not only ruled for
the plaintiffs but stayed with the case for twenty-five years and a

resilient network of parents who lobbied incessantly for better community facilities and monitored them carefully, today only 4300 of
the former inmates remain institutionalized and 11,500 are in generally adequate and satisfactory group homes. Nine institutions have

been shut down; all are expected to be gone by the year 2000.63

Dixon and its cohort litigation teach us lessons. Identifying a

legal right to redress an inequity in the treatment of a group long
suppressed does not in our complex society carry with it any assurance society will do better. It may be a necessary first step, but it is
one with unintended and unforeseen consequences. 64 Institutional
interests, be they asylum staff or government bureaucrats, are
change-averse and cringe at risk; without persistent pressure from

concerned relatives, lobbyists, and community leaders, a system will
tum is building in support of proposals that would give health workers and mental
health officials more authority to force people into treatment against their will," i.e.,
to make involuntary commitment easier for mentally ill homeless people. Lisa W.
Foderaro, New York DebatesIts Rules for Committing Mentally Ill, N.Y. TiMES,June
17, 1994, at Al. One bill would place those released from mental hospitals under
court order to take medication and get counseling at risk of being returned to the
hospitals as a form of "outpatient commitment" if they refused. Id. See also Ian
Fisher, Bill Compels Carefor Mentally Ill, N.Y. Tims, July 1, 1994, at Al. Most
recently New York has come up with a plan to create a "managed-care network" for
35,000 of the State's mentally ill in the community, using Medicaid funds. Each
patient would be provided a single care provider who would act as a gatekeeper to
access to other special housing and outpatient services, and that gatekeeper would
be held accountable for serving the patient. Savings on hospital beds would be channelled into mobile treatment teams and home visits. Lisa W. Foderaro, Albany
Seeks Managed Care for Mentally Ill on Medicaid, N.Y. TirEs, Nov. 13, 1994,
(Metro) 45.
62. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715
(E.D.N.Y. 1975); see also New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
63. Michael Winerip, Turning Words of Compassion Into Solutions, N.Y. TiMES,
July 11, 1993, at 27. But even in the community, tragic things still happen. See Selwyn Raab, Abuse Found in Centerfor Retarded,N.Y. TIMEs, July 7, 1994, at B4 ($2
million spent between 1988 and 1992 for mentally retarded in community home
bought "ragged clothes, vermin-infested beds, a regular diet of pork and beans and a
tongue-lashing if residents spoke during meals").
64. See, e.g.,
Jencks, supra note 46, at 24 (Medicaid payments provided financial
incentives for short-term psychiatric care in general hospitals and long-term care
nursing homes; Supplemental Security Income's availability only to discharged patients was incentive for their release, but since low benefits meant they could afford
only meager shelters not meeting their needs, many drifted onto streets).
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not turn around because a legal decree says it should.' There will
always be other voices competing for the resources needed to transform the system, even when change will save money in the long run.
Sometimes a dogged judge can make the difference by insisting that
something be done, but in the climate of the '80s-perhaps the '90s
as well-that kind of intervention is too often condemned as judicial
activism.
David Rothman, the social historian, has aptly said that the reforms of one generation become the scandals of the next.' It is
something for public interest lawyers to think about as they contemplate redistributive lawsuits. Yet, on balance, I would not apply
Rothman's aphorism to either Mills or Dixon. My experience does,
however, suggest caution in one's aspirations, care in an attempt to
predict at least the immediate consequences of a legal victory, and
commitment to seeing the aftermath of such a lawsuit through to
some tangible gain. Too many lawsuits cannibalize dozens of shortterm lawyers until there are no survivors in the litigation who remember how it all started. The glory of a legal victory, even in the
Supreme Court, fades fast. Some successes can be claimed on the
basis of a court's legal ruling alone, but where a public interest lawyer enters the arena of public policy and resource allocation, she
needs the energy and perseverance of a long-distance runner, not a
sprinter, and the humility to be satisfied with incremental gains. The
balance in determining when to bring a lawsuit with major implications for allocation of public monies is a delicate one. If a vulnerable population is suffering a loss in fact as well as in law, that alone
may be enough, regardless of the dislocations that will follow. But
should the lawyer make a reasonable if rough judgment that the
same population will not be worse off as an immediate result of a
legal victory, must she not be willing to pursue the proper remedy in
many fora for months and years to make it a net gain for her hapless
clients? If she hits and runs, as many part-timers in the public interest area undoubtedly do, can she rest easily with the simple notch in
her legal belt? I leave it to you to ponder this enigma as you make
your career and litigation choices.
I.

THE GovERNimNT LAWYER

Most lawyers who do not represent private clients work for the
government-federal, state, or local. The government is, after all,
65. Community groups can make a difference. See Diana Shaman, About Real
Estate,; Mentally Ill Residents Share a Project, N.Y. Tmms, Apr. 8, 1994, at B7 (22
mentally ill persons share public-supported residences with 29 formerly homeless
single parent families).
66. JoHN Q.LAFoND & MARY L. DURHAM, BACK TO THE ASYLuM 100 (1992)
(quoting DAvWD J.ROTiwAN, CONSCImNCE AND CONVENmNCE: THm AsYLut AND
rrs ALTERNATIvEs IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1971).
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supposed to be the ultimate embodiment of the public interest. A
government lawyer works on behalf of the public, as an elected or
appointed official, in which role he gets to define officially what the
public interest is.67 Every time an administration changes, there is
keen competition among lawyers for top government policy spots.
I have worked as a lawyer for the government in several capacities, principally as a staff lawyer in the Justice Department in the
mid-sixties, and as an Assistant Attorney General in the late seventies. I learned in those stints the constraints of government lawyering as well as its rewards. There are two decisions a government
lawyer confronts during her career in the public service: What is the
most enlightened decision for the public interest? And what if I disagree with the decision my superior has made about the public
interest?
At first glance the first decision sounds energizing, but the criteria
by which a public servant judges what is in the interest of the people
is not so clear. She may look for the public interest as objectively
defined by the popular vote, illustrated by opinion polls, or in the
persona of an elected (and hence politically accountable) official
who is her boss. What the lawyer herself subjectively thinks about
the public interest does not usually matter much, at least until she
reaches the pinnacle of power. There are also long-term and shortterm public interests in government lawyering. A particular position may seem to bring about the most appealing result in the instant case but in the long run present real risks as applied to likely
future policies. The government is a repeat litigator in court; it cannot, or at least should not, present one position today and another
tomorrow. The government, in concept, represents all the people.
If the interests of one group are pitted against another, on what basis does the government lawyer decide which interest should prevail? The one with the most constituents, the one whose benefits
exceed the costs to others, or the one which occupies the higher
moral ground? There are also institutional policies and precedents
to take into account. No administration starts life anew; cost/benefit
analyses may militate toward letting some needs go in favor of
others that will produce greater payoff for the resources expended.
And politics are ever-present in government policymaking. What
will the political spillover be in adopting one policy over another? Is
it fair to consider whether the "right" decision could result in weak-

67. See Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Government: Justiceand the Civil
Division, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 181 (1990) (government lawyer represents client
agency, government as a whole, and public interest; this tripartite role occasions
conflict).
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ening an administration to the extent it might be replaced by another that would make far fewer decisions in the public interest?'
That is old stuff to political science buffs, but it is still surprising
how many political appointees enter government service brightly
self-confident only to find early on that their options are severely
constrained by departmental or agency tradition or precedent, by
political considerations, even by the need to keep the loyalty of permanent civil servant "troops" who can make or break a political appointee. Quite a few conclude that it is easier to stick with the status
quo than take the heat that envelops changemakers. Experience
shows that if appointees do initiate reforms of any consequence,
they could be gone before their time as their enemy quota expands
until it is large and powerful enough to "get them." There have
been seven Deputy Attorneys General in the last ten years; the Federal Housing Administration has had thirteen commissioners in the
past fourteen years, and three different Assistant Secretaries for
Post-Secondary Education served in one eighteen-month period in
1991-92.69
On the issue of deciding what is in the public interest, I cite a
dilemma faced very early in my job as a Department of Justice Congressional Liaison. During his presidential campaign, which came
on the heels of Watergate and the firing in the Saturday Night Massacre of Archibald Cox, the Special Prosecutor, President Carter
had proclaimed support for an Independent Counsel law, even
though the Criminal Division of the Justice Department had been
traditionally opposed to it and even though some Carter appointees
in the Department privately said it was institutionally a dangerous
idea. The Attorney General, of course, was committed to the President's call on the issue, whatever his personal opinions. The Senate
Judiciary Committee-not only its members but its senior staffwas also divided on the issue, and the bill was destined to rise or fall
there. Early in the hearings, one of the old-time staffers took me
aside in the corridor and said plainly, "We know you have to follow
the White House position in public; we also know the Department
of Justice is conflicted on this; but if you give the word, we'll kill the
Independent Counsel bill in committee." A nod would have pleased
the older institutional interests at the Department, probably not
brought tears to the eyes of some Carter appointees there, and my
role would have been indiscernible at the White House. Even then,
a novitiate of government, I was not so naive as to misunderstand
68. 1& at 192 (detailing "how hard it is [for a government lawyer] to define the
public interest except in terms of the current administration's policies").
69. Stephen Barr, When the Job Gets Old After Only Two Years, VASH. POST,
June 2, 1994, at A21 (reporting on General Accounting Office study on length of
stay of 567 top-ranking presidential appointees); see also The PermanentNon-Government, WAsh. PosT, June 3,1994, at A22 ("relationship between civil servants and
political appointees... needs fixing").
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that. Out of a combination of personal beliefs and ethical constraint, I declined the offer, the bill became law, and I believe the
history of the 1980s proved that to be the right choice. But a choice
it was. Earlier that year a Department of Justice veteran "accidentally" left on the hearing room bench a very critical intra-departmental analysis of a motor-voter bill supported by the White House,
and the bill died in committee. There are opportunities aplenty for
government lawyers to undermine their superiors' views of the public interest in favor of their own, a temptation that is not always
resisted.
And there comes a time in the career of some government lawyers when they confront the ultimate choice: a conscience that does
not permit them to "go along" with a proposed position of the Administration or Department. The conflict must be a very serious one
to give rise to such resistance or the individual should not be in government to begin with. The most famous resignations in recent
times occurred during the Saturday Night Massacre in October
1974, when President Nixon ordered the firing of Archibald Cox in
order to stop his judicial challenge to the President's claim of privilege on the Watergate White House tapes. Attorney General Elliot
Richardson resigned rather than carry out Cox's dismissal, and Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus followed suit.70 According to one account, at the time of resignation, President Nixon
urged Richardson to delay his departure because of a Middle East
crisis and accused him of putting his "personal commitments ahead
of the public interest."'" Solicitor General Robert Bork then became Acting Attorney General and implemented the President's order, a course that haunted him during his unsuccessful bid for the
Supreme Court in 1987. History has treated the resigners well, bestowing upon them the label of men of principle.
But it does not always turn out that way. Last year several midlevel officials in the State Department quit their jobs to protest U.S.
policy in Bosnia, asking that we intensify diplomatic efforts, end the
arms embargo against the Bosnian Muslims; and bomb the Serbian
artillery shelling Sarajevo. They all had promising futures. One
compiled daily reports on the Serbian atrocities in Bosnia and said,
"You close your eyes and get holograms of the carnage in your
mind." According to the Washington Post, he handed in his resignation, writing, "I am personally and professionally heartsick by the
unwillingness of the United States to make resolution of the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia a top foreign policy priority." Another
said, "What we were doing was not only wrong... it was something
I couldn't participate in.... We would write stuff we knew bears no
70. Lawrence Stem, Cox Affair: Far From the End of Nixon's Troubles, WASH.
POST, Oct. 28, 1974, at Al, A6.
71. STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 405-06 (1978).
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relation to what was happening.... And ultimately you wanted to
cry." Secretary of State Warren Christopher denounced his resignation as the act of a "young officer." Hundreds of congratulatory
calls and notes followed the men's resignations, and one eventually
found a job with a congressional critic of the Bosnian policy. The
others left government, at considerable sacrifice to their careers and
to their pocketbooks.'
Resignations on principle usually produce a week-long flurry of
television interviews and then deadening silence and the need to
find another job with the threatening line on the resume-Resigned
in Protest. In the case of Bosnia, the Administration policy a year
later tracked at least some of what these young men were asking.
Was their early retirement worth it? Could they have been as effective if they waited to press their course of action later?
By its very nature, government service is likely to involve more
policy tradeoffs and judgment calls than private advocacy. Career
civil servants can advise but often do not decide and yet it is they
who must carry out policies whether they like them or not. Political
appointees must be realistic about the compromises necessary to run
government, yet they too can be seduced by the siren call of "team
spirit." Whatever it takes to keep the Administration in power is by
definition worthy. Critical choices come with the turf. A government lawyer should always have some line he will not cross, some
pang of conscience he will not suppress, if he is truly to serve the
public interest.

III. THE JUDGE
There is a third class of public interest lawyer-the judge. She is
a public servant to be sure, sworn to devote her efforts to uphold the
laws and Constitution, eschewing all private interests. Yet she is altogether different from a government lawyer who serves a political,
elected Administration and advocates the best interests of that Administration inside and outside. A judge must be as wary of the
political branches as of private parties; her job often involves setfling disputes between the two. Indeed, Thomas Jefferson and
James Madison believed that a judge's primary raison d'etre was to
protect citizen rights from majoritarian tyranny, even popularly
elected tyrants. 73 Only a fortunate few get the opportunity to judge,
72. Laura Blumenfeld, A Sense of Resignation: The Bosnia Dissenters, WASH.
PosT, Aug. 28, 1993, at Fl, F6. See also John M. Gesko, In the Foreign Service
Complaints Grow About Clinton's Team, VAsH. PosT, June 20, 1994, at A13 (since
the 1991 breakup of Yugoslavia, five State Department employees have resigned in
publicized protests against U.S. policy, one a 30-year veteran of the Foreign Service
and former ambassador to Yugoslavia).
73. "[I]ndependent tribunals of justice ... will be an impenetrable bulwark
against every assumption of power in the Legislative or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the
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and I am grateful to be one of them-despite the relative anonymity
and inevitable constraints it places on speaking out, staying politically active, and gossiping at cocktail parties. But how exactly does
a judge advance the public interest? What dilemmas are lurking in
this most enviable of public interest jobs? Why do a fair number of
able, public-spirited citizens turn it down or eventually leave it for
other jobs?7 4 What are the rules of the judging game?

Tomes have been written on the appropriate role of a judge in a
democratic society. In recent years, I think unfortunately, they have
tended to focus almost exclusively on admonitions that judges
should not invade the policymaking functions of the political
branches-the Executive and the Legislature. Judges in that taxonomy are activist or restrained (the first is bad, the second good),
according to whether they give a lot or too little deference to the
interpretations of statutes and the Constitution made by Executive
agencies. 75
Most commentators on the judicial role debunk the "strawman"
of legal formalism-the judge who mechanically applies a set of
rules called "the law" to each situation, as well as more extreme
forms of "legal realism" in which all sorts of factors personal to the
judge, including what he ate for breakfast, combine to produce one
decision rather than another, sometimes called the "chaos theory"
of decisionmaking. Reasonable commentators recognize the need
for judges to follow ascertainable rules and to be insulated from economic or personal ties that might motivate them not to follow those
rules. But they also recognize that where fixed rules do not resolve
the matter, the judge should and does make decisions that try to
maximize social welfare. In Boston University Dean Ronald Cass's
words:
The judge in my model is constrained from most outcomes by
governing authority [and] takes those authorities seriously
Constitution by the declaration of rights." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 437-39 (Joseph
Gales ed., 1834) (quoting James Madison introducing the Bill of Rights in 1789 on
the floor of the House of Representatives). See also letter from Thomas Jefferson to
James Madison (March 15, 1789), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BIL OF
RIoHs: A DOCUMNrARY HISTORY 620 (1971) (advocating virtue of Bill of Rights
for "the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary").
74. See generally EMILY FIELD VAN TASSEL Er AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL HISTORY
OFFICE, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, WHY JUDGES RESIGN: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL SERVICE,

1789

TO

1992 (1993) (7% or 189 federal judges resigned

for reasons other than health or age in 203 years).
75. See, eg., Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of JudicialSelf-Restraint, 59 IND.
L.J. 1, 11-12 (1983). Compare, however, RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & ECONOMICS
WORKING PAPER No. 93-003, WHAT Do JUDGES AND JUSTICES MAXIMIZE? (THE
SAME EVERYBODY ELSE DOES) (1993) (economic model of judges analogizes incentives to those of voters, nonprofit enterprises, and theatre-goers).
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...[But] the judge's own internal compass-his sense of
justice, of good results, of proper professional conduct-can
exert a powerful influence on decisions.... Many controversial decisions... about desegregation, about rights of criminal
defendants, about speech
6 rights seem... difficult to explain
apart from this factor.

I think in the main Dean Cass is right on, but let me take his
formula through the paces in a few areas of judging I deal with, to
show how one judge defines the public interest.
A. Agency Cases: Results and Rationales

Cass's model judge defines the public interest in terms of following precedent, maximizing the law's predictability, and even in many
cases subordinating one's own judgments to other judges' for unanimity's sake. In a majority of cases that formula probably works.
In our circuit, for instance, up to 50% of our docket consists of appeals from regulatory agencies, where, candidly, the judges' greatest
challenge lies in understanding the nature of the dispute between
the parties, deeply embedded as it usually is in arcane scientific and
technical terms and equations. Generally, we only decide agency
appeals against the government if we can't understand the agency's
reasoning or think it missed some vital inquiry or, occasionally, if
the agency has definitely (not just maybe) misinterpreted the statute. Of course there is always a judgment factor in deciding how
muddy the agency's reasoning has to be before we refuse to defer to
it-especially if the result looks defensible. But rarely in the garden
variety administrative law cases do we come even close to factoring
our own public policy preferences or doubts into our decision. Sierra Club v. Costle, 7 the longest decision I ever wrote (and which
may go down in judicial archives largely for that distinction) represented months spent in mastering the data on which Clean Air Act 78
new source performance standards for fossil fuel utility plants were
based; yet the end result was to affirm the agency, and although the
case had enormous consequences for the utility and coal industries,
it had little precedential value because of its fact-based nature.79
Now many commentators said we let the agency get off too easily,
that the real reason behind the EPA's final rule was an abject submission to pressure exerted from Congress to save the West Virginia
coal industry. As a judge, however, I was not supposed to take ac76. Ronald A. Cass, Judging 29, 36 (1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with

author).
77. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988).
79. Costle stretches for 133 pages in the Federal Reporter. At the end of the
opinion, I summed up the simple rationale of our decision with a touch of irony. "In

this case, we have taken a long while to come to a short conclusion: the rule is
reasonable." Id
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count of such factors, though I certainly knew about them by dint of
the involved parties and commentators mailing us gratis copies of
everything they wrote on the subject. The courts' job under the Administrative Procedure Act80 was simply to insure that the administrative process was not capricious or unfair, and the agency had
made a defensible choice.
There are many, many cases where I do not like the results I approve, and if I were a legislator or even an administrator I would
rule the other way. Yet principle, precedent, and, yes, practicality
(my colleagues or those higher up would promptly reverse if I deviated far from norms) stay my hand.
B. Where Precedent Leaves Off, Where Does JudicialActivism or
Restraint Lie?
Two aspects of administrative law that have produced great controversy are the threshold doctrines of standing and ripeness, the
gatekeepers of accessibility to the courts. The application of these
entirely judicially-made doctrines determines whether courts ever
get to the merits of a controversy at all. Every year we dismiss
about 15% of our appeals for failure to make it over these hurdles.
The post-Warren Supreme Court, beginning back in the 1970s, laid
down a triple-pronged test for deciding who could bring an action,
including an appeal, in federal court. The plaintiff must show (1)
that he has suffered actual or imminent injury, (2) that the injury
was caused by the defendant's action, and (3) that the court can set
it right."' Sounds simple, but in complex government regulatory
programs, particularly those that use governmental grants or other
economic incentives to motivate private third parties to act in a certain way, a showing that the third party is directly responsible for
the plaintiff's injury is not so easy for plaintiffs to make. I personally believe that the standing necessary to challenge a government
program should be satisfied if the governmental action was a major
contributory factor to the private party's action that caused the
plaintiff harm. The majority of my court, however, does not agree
and has imposed ever stricter requirements for showing direct causation, even when there are already legislative findings of a causeand-effect relationship between the governmental programs and the
plaintiff's grievances. 2 Many of us see an important public interest
served in getting to the merits of real and serious controversies in80. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1988).
81. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1976).
82. See, e.g., Center for Auto Safety v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 843 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en

banc) (court evenly divided on issue of standing of auto safety membership organization to challenge CAFE standards rule that compensates auto manufacturers retroactively for changes in testing procedures used to measure fuel economy of their

fleet).
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volving major governmental programs and find it more judicial activism than judicial restraint to second-guess the legislature when it
specifically makes findings on the nexus required for standing.
Surely in most cases the Congress has closer ties with the real world
and better means of getting accurate information about how things
work out there than we judges do.
C. Constitutional Conundrums
When a judge is faced with construing the Constitution, as opposed to a statute, the prism through which she views the public
interest changes perceptibly. Our Founding Fathers conceived of
the federal judiciary as the major bulwark for the individual against
the will of the majority. A constitutional scholar has aptly observed
that, "In almost every case in which they have declared a constitutional right, the courts have acted contrary to the discernible wishes
of a majority of the people." 3 Thus judges can hardly defer to the
political branches as to what is in the public interest in constitutional
cases; the public interest must be viewed as the longer-term interest
of the nation in honoring its constitutional pact. Where constitutional text itself (or prior Supreme Court construction of that text) is
not determinative, searches for resolutions that enhance the basic
values enshrined in the Constitution must be launched. I don't need
to tell you that judges can and do differ on what the values embodied in the Constitution are and how they balance out against each
other.
The most vexing constitutional issues in my time on our court
have arisen in the areas of race, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination. The problem of what, if any, and when racial or gender
factors should be favored in government benefits programs has
proven a continued source of controversy in our courts. In 1985 the
case of Steele v. FCC' dealt with the then Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") policy of awarding an extra credit to women
managers-owners in comparative broadcast licensing hearings. The
justification for this preference was that the woman's close involvement in station operations would likely produce more diverse programming, something the FCC could not directly decree. A similar
extra credit for racial minorities had been in place for many years
and approved previously by our court. The majority of the Steele
panel, however, decided that the racial minority credit should not be
extended to gender, because that would not be in the "public interest." In effect, the court was saying it knew better than the FCC
what the public interest required. I dissented on the basis that a
history of exclusion of women as well as the present paucity of women in broadcasting justified the FCC's policy of encouraging diver83. Jack Greenberg, quoted in ARoN, supra note 4, at 108.
84. 770 F.2d 1192 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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sity by awarding women an extra credit. Before the case could be
heard en banc, the FCC petitioned for a remand in order to conduct
an inquiry into the constitutionality of any credit based on gender.
Congress then intervened and forbade the FCC to hold any such
inquiry; the FCC obliged and a new appeal was taken from another
decision, Lamprecht v. FCC,' allowing the credit. In the meantime,
a new variation on the racial preference in FCC licenses had also
come up on appeal involving a challenge to the constitutionality of a
different FCC program that gave minority owners a preference in
buying out licenses of existing station owners who were confronting
trouble in relicensing. A second panel, on which I also ended up
dissenting, ruled the preference unconstitutional as unjustified by
any particularized evidence of past discrimination against minorities
in broadcasting.86 This decision went on up to the Supreme Court
where Justice Brennan, in the last opinion he ever filed, called Metro
Broadcasting v. FCC, reversed our court and held that deference to
87
Congress required that the preference be found constitutional.
We now returned to the women's preference issue again, as it
reappeared on appeal in the Lamprechtas case. This time a panel
different from the panel that decided Metro Broadcasting found
Congress had no empirical basis on which to legislate the credit for
women as a means to diversity programming. This decision, written
by Judge Thomas, seemed at the time extremely vulnerable in that it
laid down a constitutional standard of evidence for legislative findings at odds with the deference the Supreme Court has traditionally
given in other cases. Judge Thomas distinguished the Metro Broadcasting racial preference decision on grounds I found unpersuasive.
I still see no way to reconcile the two cases in any principled way;
the women's preference case was not appealed to the High Court,
but it is difficult to see how any view of the public interest is served
by the present paradox.
In the volatile area of gay and lesbian rights, our court has been
similarly conflicted. Just this past year, in Steffan v. Aspin,8 9 we
dealt with a case that arose under a prior incarnation of the "don't
ask, don't tell" policy for homosexuals in the military. Steffan involved the Annapolis midshipman who admitted he was gay and
was forthwith discharged from the Academy and the Navy although
no evidence of active homosexual conduct was ever introduced. The
original panel, of which I was a member, decided that a discharge
based solely on an admission of homosexual orientation, without ev85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
(D.C.

958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Shurberg Broadcasting v. FCC, 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Metro Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d at 382.
8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated, No. 91-5409, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 9977
Cir. Jan. 7, 1994) (per curiam).
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idence of homosexual conduct, was unconstitutional. We were
promptly en banced by our brethren, even though the government
did not itself ask for rehearing on the main issue. The outcome of
that en banc decided that the Navy could infer from Steffan's admission of homosexuality that he was likely to engage in prohibited
conduct. 90 I wrote a strong dissent for myself and two colleagues,
finding no rational basis for such an inference, given our long constitutional tradition of refusing to sanction individuals on the basis of
status alone." The question for me was quite simple: Could I conscientiously conclude that practicing gays can be excluded from the
military because of the revulsion of others or because of a popular
belief, unsupported by record evidence, that anyone who admits to
being gay inevitably acts out his sexual preferences? The issue persists under the new "don't ask, don't tell" policy. Indeed, several
federal district courts around the country have found both the old
and new gays in the military policies unconstitutional, despite apparent overwhelming support among our political and military leaders
of such a policy. 2
D. The Public Interest in Dissenting
A judge's job is to resolve cases and to declare what the law is. In
appellate courts the judges may not always agree. In many countries there is only one opinion rendered by a court, whether all
judges agree with it or not; the dissenters by rule are silent. The
rationalization for this judicial mode is that it is unsettling to citizens
and to the development of a stable body of law to have judges publicly disagreeing with each other. Our practice is different; from the
beginning we have had a tradition of eloquent dissent, what Chief
Justice Hughes called an "appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to
the intelligence of a future day, when a later decision may possibly
correct the error into which the dissenting judge believes the court
to have been betrayed. . . ,"I A judge must still, however, think

carefully about whether it really is in the public interest to take issue
with a majority opinion, display its weaknesses, and plead for a dif-

90. Steffan v. Perry, 1994 VL 652249, at *1(D.C. Cir. Nov. 22, 1994) (en banc).
91. Id at *20 (Wald, J., dissenting).
92. See e.g., Camnmermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (esbian nurse's discharge under Army Reg. 135-175 declared violation of her constitutional rights); Dahl v. Sec. of U.S. Navy, 830 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Cal. 1993)
(discharge from Navy for admission of homosexuality declared unconstitutional).
See also Meinhold v. United States Dep't of Defense, No. 93-56354, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23705, at *31 (9th Cir. Aug.31, 1994) (construing old regulations not to apply to admissions of homosexuality in order to avoid constitutional questions).
93. Charles Evans Hughes, The Supreme Court of the United States 68 (1928).
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ferent result or rationale. Some judges hardly ever dissent. Some
make a career out of it. Most of us fall somewhere between. 4
I do agree that dissents are not lightly to be undertaken; they
strain collegial relations and, too freely indulged in, can undermine
a judge's credibility with colleagues or even reviewing courts. Yet,
fifteen years on an appellate court have convinced me that unanimity is not always in the public interest. Doctrine evolves as a continuing dialogue among judges and among courts, and a dissent of
substance has a healthy tendency to keep the majority responsible
by forcing it to confront the most difficult implications of its holding;
many times the majority opinion is itself improved or refined in the
process. Moreover, a dissent sends a message to other courts confronting the same issue as well as to the Supreme Court that there
are two sides to the issue that must be weighed. Dissents also have
currency in Congress where, in their aftermath, legislative adjustments are often sought to nullify court rulings.
I have never subscribed to the notion that it is intrinsically "better" to be a "joiner" even when one thinks the ruling is wrong and
no concessions are given by the majority in an effort to cure the
harm asserted by the dissenter (it is a harder question where the
majority is willing to give something up for your concurrence that
will make the law less wrong or limit its harmful impact). Similarly,
it is difficult to justify going along in order to arrive at an admirable
consensus when the judge is still convinced her own painstakinglyarrived-at view is right. These days, our law changes dramatically
and rapidly in many areas, and well-considered dissents can help
pave the way to tomorrow's majorities. Judges are not infallible and
it is not in the public interest to advance a myth that judges gratuitously dissent out of arrogance or pettiness. The public should see
us for what judges are-or should be-hardworking, caring,
thoughtful, intelligent weighers of evidence and arguments dedicated not just to the rule of law but also to the rule of a law aiming
at justice. We need to stay within our limits but we also have much
discretion and the public needs to see how we use or abuse it. If
there is basic disagreement within a court about the direction the
law is taking, the public needs to know that too. That is what judging in the public interest is about.
94. In his latest book, Judge Coffin discussed the effect of dissenting and concurring opinions on judicial collegiality. Judge Coffin wrote: "In over a quarter of a
century I have authored some 2300 opinions; in that period I have written only
twenty-seven dissents and twenty-one concurrences. That may signal a craven yielding to a majority, but I prefer to think of it rather a testament to the efficacy of real
collegial interaction in reaching a result all can accept." FRANK M. COFN, ON
APPEA, 225 (1994). Judge Coffin also defined the instances in which he believed a
dissent was legitimate though, like a "broadsword," recognizing its capacity to
"draw" a little blood. Ild. at 227-29.
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CONCLUSION

Concluding, let me quote a provocative warning from Learned
Hand about the need or the wisdom of consciously devoting one's
career to serving others.
[I]f it be selfishness to work on the job one likes, because one
likes it and for no other end, let us accept the odium. I had
rather live forever in a company of Don Quixotes, than among
a set of wraiths professing to be solely moved to the betterment of one another.... Let us then, if one insists on candour, do our jobs for ourselves; we are in no danger of
disserving the State.95
Not every great judge has agreed with Hand; Brennan, Marshall,
probably Holmes, did not. Certainly my old boss on the Second Circuit and Hand's good friend in his latter years, the irrepressible reformer Jerome Frank, did not. Many of us feel the shadow of
justice-however ephemeral and gossamer its shape-hovering at
our side. Order and discipline, in Hand's words, "a complicated series of formulae which we impose upon the flux," 96 does not sufficiently define what we are about. For many of us and for you I
hope, too, there must be a resonance of our work in the world
around us. Theory and justice must meet sometime, somewhere.
Good law must improve the lot of mankind, not denigrate it. A lawyer or judge is not a pure mathematician or physicist searching only
for eternal principles that already exist somewhere out there. She is
a channeller of that flux Hand talked about. But-and this is the
end of my simple message to you-she must be a careful and responsible channeller; good intentions will not suffice. While the law
of unintended consequences visits all of our efforts, those who work
in the public service or for the public interest have special obligations to try to anticipate some of those consequences and stay the
course to mitigate or divert them. To take Hand's advice literally
would make the ideal lawyer a kind of Alec Guiness, supervising the
building of the Bridge over the River Quai with attention only to
craftsmanship, oblivious of the role that bridge will serve in the
greater war. We need well-built bridges, but in the right places for
the right reasons. It is very hard work, and I wish you well at it.

95. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAN: THE MAN AND TH JUDOE 402 (1994).
reviewed by First Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Frank M. Coffin, Reclaiming a
GreatJudge's Legacy, 46 ME. L. REv. 377 (1994).
96. GUNTmER, supra note 95, at 402.

